Project TempDir creation is insecure. The attacker will (a) observe or guess the cron process PID, (b) prepare a directory wherein a symlink service_foo -> some strategic path exists, (c) attempt to rename this to the cron job's TempDir at the critical moment before the invocation of mkdir but after the -d -e checks. Succeeding that, the privileged process will go on to overwrite some system file of your choosing. For the shoddy code in question, the attack is even simpler: neither rmdir nor unlink can remove a directory with files, so all the attacker needs to do is prepare 32766 tempdirs and wait for the hour to strike.

As for repair suggestions, mkdtemp, checking return values, and so on.

You're welcome.

Edit. The vulnerable section:

$TempDir =  $TempDir. "project2." . $$ . "/";
if ( -d $TempDir ) {
    rmdir ($TempDir);
    #print "\nRemoving Existing Temp Dir";
}
if ( -e $TempDir ) {
    unlink ($TempDir);
    #print "\nRemoving the tempdir if it is existing as a file\n";
}
mkdir ($TempDir,0700);
print "\nMaking Temp Dir: " . $TempDir . "\n";
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