in reply to OT: Storing encryption keys securely

In case it gives you ideas for improving your security, I'll make some general comments on key management, based on my limited experience in this domain. Ideas, corrections, and feedback welcome.

Companies with high security needs and big budgets tend to employ Key Management Servers (KMS) and/or Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) to protect their keys. I have some experience with writing (C++) client code that uses a KMS. I have no first-hand experience with HSMs.

The overall strategy is to setup a dedicated and separate physical machine - a Key Management Server - to manage and protect all keys in your system. The KMS is configured to talk to trusted clients only. KMS's can be expensive - and physically isolated if required. Clients of the KMS must supply a set of credentials (e.g. a certificate issued by the KMS vendor).

References

  • Comment on Re: OT: Storing encryption keys securely

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Re^2: OT: Storing encryption keys securely
by Anonymous Monk on Jan 25, 2017 at 16:18 UTC
    All of which misses the point. If a client is compromised, an attacker can use its credentials to request any key he wants from the KMS.