Two problems with that retort:

1. It would be hard to code a patch to handle an attack vector that -- to the best of my ability to discover; and despite requests for further information and a promise of "I would release a full-disclosure document in the middle to last week of march." -- it seems has never been publicly described, let alone demonstrated.

   Indeed -- whilst I'm still waiting to hear back from mitre (CVE DB maintainers) and a couple of other likely organisations -- I can find no trace that anyone other than demerphq has ever been made party to the details of the vulnerability.

2. Also, based upon the scant information I have been able to glean -- and a lot of unfortunately necessary supposition -- it seems likely that any one of several one-line patches might serve to totally mitigate the possibility of CVE-2013-1667.

   With the added upside that almost none of the pain caused by the implemented solution would have been necessary.

I'm preparing a paper -- which will probably come in 4 or 5 parts -- now. But it would surely be easier, and maybe even unnecessary, if disclosure were made.