in reply to Re: opening files: link checking and race conditions
in thread opening files: link checking and race conditions

dave_the_m: O_NOFOLLOW is a great start. Since, as a rule, suid/guid only matters on *nix scripts, and in fact this one is designed specifically for *nix (it uses /home/username in it) that'll do nicely. I'll put a warning in the header to ensure that it's only run on systems that correctly implement O_NOFOLLOW; I'm suprised I hadn't seen that flag in my wanderings. Thanks!

Tanktalus: sudo doesn't help; I don't care who's running it, in fact anyone should be able to (that's the point of suid, right? Run as one user when you're really another). Also, writing via a symlink /is/ often a Very Bad Idea; see the example in dave_the_m's reply below. If the user is suid root, then you've appended to rhosts, and suddenly there are people being trusted who shouldn't be.

graff, sk: I know it looks that simple, but bear in mind that processes run "concurrently" (not really, unless you're on a multiprocessor system, but they fake it). So looking at dave_the_m's example, all you need is for the timing to be just right. Since as a rule a malicious attacker doesn't mind running something (probably nice'd) a few thousand times to get an attack to work, testing before and after isn't enough. Google "atomicity" for more info.

So: a general solution? Seems like no. One that will work for this situation? Yes. Suid isn't common on most systems that don't support the O_NOFOLLOW flag (believe it or not, suid exists to a degree on windows - eg. run 'at' as admin, have it open cmd.exe - bam you've escalated to Machine and can overwrite/modify/delete absolutely anything), so hopefully my incessant curiosity won't spend any more of my time on the topic, until it's a neccessary question again.

Thanks for all your replies, I really appreciate them! Oh monks, you have yet again shown this follower a better path.
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