Re^7: Your random numbers are not that random (UtS,L)

You see, there is no "reasonable" security. It either works, or it doesn't.

The 6-pin rim lock and 2 deadbolts on my front door can be defeated by a Challenger 2, but given the likely risks, they form "reasonable security".

Overstatement of risk is as damaging as understatement.

With the rise and rise of 'Social' network sites: 'Computers are making people easier to use everyday'

Examine what is said, not who speaks -- Silence betokens consent -- Love the truth but pardon error.

"Science is about questioning the status quo. Questioning authority".

In the absence of evidence, opinion is indistinguishable from prejudice.

The start of some sanity?

Comment on Re^7: Your random numbers are not that random (UtS,L)

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Re^8: Your random numbers are not that random (UtS,L) by cavac (Prior) on Jul 31, 2012 at 16:43 UTC
You are right, of course. Problem is, in cryptography there are probably only a handful of people worldwide for each algorithm that can actually tell you which parts of the system you can leave out and while only degrading the encryption product from "secure" to "still reasonable secure". Even a single, small error can lead to "not secure at all". So, what i meant is, a non-specialist should assume that he/she can only turn the "secure" switch on and off but has probably not the knowledge to tweak it into a point somewhere inbetween. As Dan Kaminsky said about the Debian SSL desaster (the non-randomness introduced to fix a memory access bug that wasn't one): "You know, it's not a private key if there's only 1 out of 65.000 of them". Youtube Video at 21:00. There is more on Dan's Blog. "I know what i'm doing! Look, what could possibly go wrong? All i have to pull this lever like so, and then press this button here like ArghhhhhaaAaAAAaaagraaaAAaa!!!"	[reply]

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Re^8: Your random numbers are not that random (UtS,L)
by cavac (Prior) on Jul 31, 2012 at 16:43 UTC

You are right, of course.

Problem is, in cryptography there are probably only a handful of people worldwide for each algorithm that can actually tell you which parts of the system you can leave out and while only degrading the encryption product from "secure" to "still reasonable secure". Even a single, small error can lead to "not secure at all".

So, what i meant is, a non-specialist should assume that he/she can only turn the "secure" switch on and off but has probably not the knowledge to tweak it into a point somewhere inbetween.

As Dan Kaminsky said about the Debian SSL desaster (the non-randomness introduced to fix a memory access bug that wasn't one): "You know, it's not a private key if there's only 1 out of 65.000 of them". Youtube Video at 21:00. There is more on Dan's Blog.

"I know what i'm doing! Look, what could possibly go wrong? All i have to pull this lever like so, and then press this button here like ArghhhhhaaAaAAAaaagraaaAAaa!!!"

[reply]